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Executive summary 
 
 
This literature review makes a preliminary assessment of the available academic and policy-oriented literature 
on social movements in states in situations of fragility, and affected by conflict. It examines who becomes 
involved in collective action and why, the barriers to mobilisation and, where social movements do emerge, 
how these are able to sustain mobilisation and broaden their membership base to reflect the interests of the 
wider community. In general, it should be noted that there is limited material in the public domain that 
addresses the issue of social movements with respect to state fragility specifically. There is, further, a dearth of 
studies that are based on qualitative social research with movement members and leaders in conflict-affected 
and fragile states, that might give a more evidence-based insight into the dynamics of movement mobilisation 
and strategising. 
 
The term ‘fragility’ can be and is applied to a large number of very different states: from those experiencing 
outright conflict, situations where the state is deemed to have failed, and strong states with authoritarian 
tendencies. Reflecting this, the countries covered in this review reflect a range of governance situations, with 
different implications for how social movements engage with and are viewed by the state. For the purpose of 
this review, social movements are considered to be membership organisations that can draw on a critical mass 
of supporters who are willing to make public displays of support for the movement’s aims. More than ad hoc, 
uncoordinated protest, social movements display a degree of politicisation and seek to change or defend the 
status quo. They have generally emerged organically, without financial or other support from external donors, 
relying instead on small contributions from members. 
 
While this review has a principal focus on movements that organise around progressive social and political 
change, and that do not engage in armed violence, the relationship between collective action and instability 
must be acknowledged. For example, peaceful protest in recent months in North Africa has led to the 
overthrow of a number of governments, previously valued by the West for their stability.  However, these 
revolutions may result in more democratic, development-oriented states.  
 
State-society relations in situations of conflict 
While social movements can generate instability, it should be stressed that their emergence does not 
represent a failure of democracy, but is an essential part of it. In situations where formal channels for people 
to voice their demands do not function, these may be expressed through street protest or by involvement in 
local associations. However, this depends on the country context, and where a state is repressive, citizens may 
withdraw from the public sphere altogether, engaging in self-censorship. In situations of fragility, even where a 
state may wish to dialogue with its citizens, there are further obstacles for societal engagement with local 
government, including a difficulty in deploying qualified staff to violent areas, damaged physical infrastructure, 
and a lack of resources to fund local government institutions. Further, where the central state lacks control 
over all its territory, organized and competing non-state actors may emerge. Here it may be difficult for social 
movements to negotiate with one actor, without fear of repercussions from another.  In tightly controlled 
corporatist states, collective action may be discouraged, as individuals who are reliant on state welfare may 
not wish to risk involvement in activity considered to be oppositional in nature. However, analysts warn 
against overstating this case, as it discounts citizens’ agency. 
 
Conflict and instability can also impact on the individuals’ desire or ability to engage in collective action. This 
requires a ‘capacity to aspire’ that can be negatively affected by violent conflict. Social relations and networks, 
which are critical to the emergence of social movements, may also be damaged by conflict, leaving a legacy of 
fear and mistrust. However, it should be noted that repression and violence can also stimulate people’s 
engagement in human rights and peace movements.  
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Women’s engagement in social movements 
The issues around which women mobilise in situations of fragility will, naturally vary from one situation to 
another, and cultural and religious factors will have implications for how women are able to organise, and 
their movements’ overall aims. Research would suggest that much women’s mobilisation during periods of 
instability starts at the local level and tends to be based around what are typically considered women’s issues 
– such as rape counselling, education, welfare rights and child care. There may be a tendency for women to 
emphasise their traditional roles, as wives or mothers, at times of conflict, as it is considered less threatening 
to society generally. However, broader forms of activism may emerge from these activities, as women gain 
experience of organizing around a common cause. They may also, as this review demonstrates, become the 
drivers of peace movements.  
 
Peace movements 
Research would suggest that social movements can play a key role in calling for peace negotiations or 
advocating for the inclusion of particular issues into a peace agreement. Social movement activism at the time 
of negotiations, notably sit-ins and demonstrations, can create alternative spaces of debate outside official 
arenas. These were used to particular effect by the women’s peace movement in Liberia, and an elite-led 
movement in Nepal. However, while women’s organisations’ impact on peace negotiations has been 
documented, women may not be able to capitalize on the empowerment they have experienced during 
conflict once peace is reached, since patriarchal societies may not be willing to accept changed gender roles. 
 
Socio-environmental movements 
Whilst war and human rights abuses can provide the spark that sets off a wave of activism in fragile states, 
natural resource extraction can also provide the impetus. In these instances, local groups mobilize when they 
find that their livelihoods are threatened by the activities of outsiders (in particular foreign companies), and 
where the wealth generated is not perceived to be shared equitably. Some separatist movements have 
employed environmental discourse as part of their struggle over land ownership. It should be noted that many 
environmental movements have a strong human rights agenda, and may approach the issue of the 
environment through the lens of human rights or greater women’s rights. Thus justice and the environment 
are closely linked, as movements seek to denounce the destruction of ancestral lands, or women’s 
marginalization, and assert traditional livelihood strategies.  
 
Organised youth and fragility 
The literature on youth involvement in collective action has a primary focus on violence and the activities of 
armed gangs. Indeed, the presence of a youthful population – often referred to as a ‘youth bulge’ – combined 
with high levels of un/underemployment is considered to be a causal factor of state fragility. However, 
unemployment and a young population do not necessarily lead to violence, and a ‘youth bulge’ cannot be used 
to predict war or violent unrest, nor is youth mobilisation necessarily violent. Nevertheless, the literature on 
social movements in fragile states in Africa is strongly weighted towards the case of violent youth movements 
in Nigeria. While there is no shortage of grievance amongst well-educated Nigerians with regard to chronic 
failings of governance, the intricate links between armed militias, decentralized politics and lucrative natural 
resource extraction prevents the emergence of more ideologically based movements, focused on systemic 
change. With few alternatives for income generation, young people (particularly young men) may organize to 
better themselves and their communities through engagement in criminal gangs. Similar patterns of behaviour 
are visible in other resource-rich states affected by conflict, notably Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. 
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Sustaining protest 
The review identifies three issues that impact upon how movements mobilise and scale up protest in conflict 
affected and fragile states: leadership, identity, and globalisation. 
 
The role played by movement leadership in mobilising and sustaining protest is key. Individual, charismatic 
leaders who show bravery by committing to their cause, despite threats of violence, can draw in movement 
members, as is the case with the Ogoni in Nigeria or the Kenyan Green Belt movement. Elite leadership can 
achieve similar results: the presence of high profile members of society at protests and sit-ins was a core part 
of a Nepali peace movement’s strategy. In other cases movements have no clear leader. This can be a 
deliberate way to avoid repression. A lack of clear leadership was characteristic of the recent pro-democracy 
movement in Egypt, that evaded the authorities by not presenting particular individuals as key figures in the 
protest, although leaders later began to emerge. It could perhaps be argued that the use of ‘small media’ such 
as text messaging and social networking sites facilitated the growth of a movement that emerged without the 
need of strong leadership. 
 
Examples of mobilisation that occur around a central figure or as a spontaneous response to a call to action, 
stand in contrast to DFID funded research that stresses how social movements emerge from years, sometimes 
generations, of local associational activity. This research emphasises local associations as an important route 
into more politicised and wider-reaching collective action. Whilst this is not the only way that social 
movements can emerge, this type of activity can clearly contribute to greater awareness of rights and the 
potential benefits of collective action, acting as a type of ‘school for citizenship’. 
 
The literature reviewed here demonstrates that local place and identity are key issues for the development of 
social movements. While local organisation and feelings of belonging can encourage people to work together 
towards a common goal, it can also prevent movements from having traction at a wider scale, and building up 
a broader support base. In many cases, it is precisely when social actors transcend class or caste boundaries 
that movements are able to promote more progressive social and political change. Movements in fragile states 
need to go beyond local identity and encourage members to engage with the state as national citizens, rather 
than as members of a particular ethnic group. Fragile states are often ethnically fragmented, and individuals 
may tend to stick to community, ethnicity and local associations. This can reinforce divisions, particularly when 
the group identifies itself in contrast to another social group that it presents as ‘other’. The relationship 
between the individual and the state may also be mediated through membership of an ethnic group. Social 
movements can reinforce this problematic relationship by placing an emphasis on narrow, localised identities 
at the expense of a more inclusive idea of citizenship linked to the national state. 
 
The review illustrates the traction that social movements in conflict affected and fragile states can gain by 
linking their demands and activities to debates overseas. Activists and their organisations can benefit from 
linking their demands to international policy debates and laws or agreements so as to gain greater legitimacy. 
This is a delicate process fraught with the potential to create conflict and contention among the different 
actors and between different levels. However, linking up to global human rights and environmental debates is 
regarded by observers to have contributed positively to attempts to raise the visibility of environmental 
struggles in Africa. Another important aspect of globalisation for social movements in situations of fragility and 
conflict is the presence of a supportive diaspora, that can undertake advocacy work and keep issues visible 
within the media, although the diaspora can take on more extremist positions than civil society in the 
homeland.  
 
Key messages 
Evidence from this review suggests the importance of considering the interplay of movement activity and state 
stability, and of taking into account existing state-society relationships. Depending on the available avenues for 
participation and levels of state responsiveness to society’s demands, social movement activism can have very 
different impacts on stability. There is a need for careful consideration of likely state responses to social 
mobilization by donors considering providing direct or indirect support to social movements. Donors will need 
to weigh up their concerns for stability alongside their aims to promote positive social and political change.   
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Social movements have the potential to democratize the state and foster a sense of citizenship amongst 
movement members. Nevertheless, western aid agencies have not historically paid social movements a great 
deal of attention. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the unpredictable nature of social 
movement organizing, their often overt politicization, and their tendency to engage in extra-legal activity. A 
number of problems are thrown up by donor financial support of social movements. It may raise fears of 
cooption or loss of autonomy; inadvertently create competition around resources; and trigger certain types of 
behaviour amongst movements, who begin to respond more to donor demands than members’ interests and 
needs. 
 
As such, donors could consider concentrating on creating a supportive environment for movements. This could 
include: 
 
 Working with governments to avoid the criminalisation of all protest. 
 Helping to support a more accepting public sphere where different views can be expressed. 
 Promoting avenues for state-society engagement early on at times of peace building. 
 Supporting the media to investigate and report human rights abuses to maintain mobilization and 
draw in support from likeminded movements elsewhere. 
 Support social movement members and leaders to use new and old media effectively.  
 Encourage and provide specific support for women’s participation and leadership in social 
movements. 
 Support movements to improve communications beyond capital cities, including translating key 
messages into languages and formats that are accessible to less well-educated groups. 
 Prioritise rights education, and promote understanding of the judiciary, so that people can recognise 
an injustice and know how to seek redress collectively. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This literature review makes a preliminary assessment of some of the available academic and policy-oriented 
literature on social movements in states in situations of fragility, and affected by conflict. It seeks to respond to 
a series of questions set out in the TORs on the nature of social mobilisation in these types of settings. It 
examines who becomes involved in collective action and why, the barriers to mobilisation and, where social 
movements do emerge, how these are able to sustain mobilisation and broaden their membership base to 
reflect the interests of the wider community.  Since the definitions of fragility and of social movements 
themselves are contested, the paper will begin by setting out the understandings of these terms on which the 
subsequent discussion is based. In general, it should be noted that there is limited material in the public 
domain that addresses the issue of social movements with respect to state fragility specifically. There is, 
further, a dearth of studies that are based on qualitative social research with movement members and leaders 
in conflict-affected and fragile states, that might give a more evidence-based insight into the dynamics of 
movement mobilisation and strategising.  
 
Definitional issues 
It should be noted that the term ‘fragility’ can be and is applied to a large number of very different states: from 
those experiencing outright conflict, situations where the state is deemed to have failed, and strong states 
with authoritarian tendencies. Reflecting this, the countries covered in this review reflect a range of 
governance situations, with different implications for how social movements engage with and are viewed by 
the state. Drawing generalisations about how social movements emerge and then sustain collective action in 
situations of fragility is thus fraught with difficulty.  
 
As noted in the GSDRC fragile states topic guide, there is no internationally agreed definition of the term 
‘fragile state’. However,  
 
Most development agencies define it principally as a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions 
necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations. Fragile states are commonly described as 
incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and 
economic opportunities for their citizens (Mcloughlin 2009: 9). 
 
Mcloughlin notes that the term ‘fragile state’ has been considered pejorative, and that there has been a move 
towards reference to ‘fragility’. She further records that in practice, state fragility is not an ‘either/or’ 
condition, but varies along a continuum of performance, as well as across areas of state function and capacity 
(ibid).  The debates around the concept are ongoing, but the problems associated with the use of the term 
have been usefully summarised by Oosterom (2009: 5): 
 
Though the ‘fragile state’ label is widely used, it easily masks the variation in state fragility and how this is 
experienced at the local level. Often the term is conflated with conflict prone societies, where the state has 
lost control over large parts of its territory and its monopoly on the use of force (e.g. Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Iraq). It is important to keep in mind that violent conflict and insecurity are equally experienced 
in authoritarian, repressive states (e.g. Angola, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe). Here, it is actually a strong state 
that causes insecurity and fails to deliver on public goods and services. In other cases there will be weak 
states that lack the capacity to deliver without the occurrence of violent conflict. Furthermore, state 
fragility can apply to so-called ‘pockets of fragility’ within an otherwise relatively stable and functioning 
state.  
 
As she goes on to note, fluctuations in state fragility also matter, and it is important to distinguish different 
types and phases of state fragility, since this will impact on the best way to promote the reconstruction of 
relations between state and society (ibid). 
 
Defining social movements is perhaps an even more complex endeavour. Debate has raged on how to 
categorise various types of collective action since the 1960s, and it has generated a huge body of literature. 
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Perhaps the classic definition is that of Charles Tilly, who defines them as groups that display ‘WUNC’ - 
worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly 2004). His work has, over the years, had a tendency to 
focus on the interaction between challengers and powerholders (Diani 2008).  However, more recent 
scholarship emphasises the networked nature of movements. For example, for Whittier (2002: 289): 
 
Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or membership. Instead, they are 
made up of shifting clusters of organizations, networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by 
participation in challenges and collective identities through which participants define the boundaries and 
significance of their groups.  
 
Diani (2008) also supports the focus on networks, placing them at the centre of his analysis by arguing that 
they ‘constitute’ a movement, as interactions with powerholders can be undertaken by a large number of 
organisations that are not connected to each other. Thus for a social movement to be categorised as such, it 
must be more than ad hoc, uncoordinated protest activities. Over time, protest and mobilisation may develop 
into a social movement organisation, or SMO. This represents the formalisation and institutionalisation of 
movement organising into a more permanent body. Whilst it is at this point that social movements might 
appear to resemble other types of civil society organisation, such as NGOs, the former are distinct in that they 
are membership organisations, and rely heavily on achieving a critical mass of individuals who are willing to 
make public displays of support for the movement’s aims.1
 
 They also emerge organically, generally without 
financial or other support from external donors, often relying instead on small contributions from members. 
Finally, the nature of collective action is important. For social movements to be understood as such, many 
scholars argue that they must have a degree of politicisation. As Foweraker (1995) points out, not everything 
that moves is a social movement, and they must in some way be mobilised around change: either challenging 
the status quo, or attempting to preserve it in the face of a threat. 
Attempts to understand social movements through theory are also extensive. These are often grouped into 
four general categories, as usefully summarised by Diani (2008: 3).  
 
The “resource mobilization approach” has focused on the resources necessary to convert grievances into 
overt protest behaviour; the “political process approach” has privileged the interaction between protestors 
and the polity and its impact on the forms and outcomes of collective action; the “framing approach” has 
investigated how cultural representations of actors’ experience develop, which can facilitate the spread of 
collective action; the “new social movements” perspective has investigated the relationship between 
structural social change and the emergence of new collective actors. 
 
For Diani, the ‘classic social movement agenda’ (ibid) involves a focus on the interplay of how resources (time, 
money, people) are mobilised, the response to changes in the political environment that will impact on 
perceptions of opportunities for, or costs of collective action, and how movements frame their demands to 
appeal to the wider public. The post-structural ‘new social movement’ theory as epitomised by Alberto 
Melucci and Alain Touraine places a greater emphasis on identity, rejecting class as a mobilising feature for 
movements and focusing on how actors can ‘produce their own society’, and bring about change in the way 
society perceives itself.  
 
However, as Charles Tilly (one of the best known movement scholars) has argued, these theoretical 
approaches do nothing more than serve as an orientating device for the sorting of observations (cited in El-
Mahdi 2009: 1016). While these approaches can be used, retrospectively, to tease out issues around 
mobilisation and movement success or failure, they have very little predictive power. Notably, it is very 
difficult to explain why movements emerge in one context but not in another where conditions might be 
considered as, or even more, favourable. However, this review notes a number of factors that can promote 
collective action, including charismatic or elite leadership, the presence of and perceived poor distribution of 
                                            
 
1 There is, however, clearly overlap between the organizational forms. Paffenholz (2009) notes a move towards the 
professionalization and formalization of activist networks, dubbed the “taming of social movements” and the “NGOization 
of social protest,” as they seek funds from international donors. Whilst this is seen to have improved professional 
performance, it has generated competition between organizations and ‘shifted accountability from the societies concerned 
to the donors themselves’ (Paffenholz 2009: 24). 
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profits from natural resource extraction; perceived discrimination against a particular ethnic group; and 
persecution and violence perpetrated by the state. However, equally, the review notes that in situations of 
conflict and fragility, fear of violence and repression may prevent people from organising, and promote 
mistrust within communities. The literature reviewed here suggests that movements are most successful when 
they are able to overcome a narrow focus on identity, to reach out to a wider constituency and engage with 
the state as national citizens.  
 
Organisation of the report 
This report is divided into four parts. The first of these presents a discussion of the literature that undertakes 
general analysis of social movements in contexts of fragility. Part two draws on case study material from a 
range of conflict-affected and fragile states looking at how and why individuals do, or do not, undertake 
collective action in situations of fragility. Part three provides some more general analysis of how movements 
manage to develop, draw in a broader constituency and promote change at the national level, considering 
issues of leadership, identity framing and globalisation. Part four considers the gaps in the literature, 
recommendations for further research and analysis, and the potential policy responses for DFID and other 
donors. 
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Part 1: Prospects for social movement emergence in 
conflict-affected states and situations of fragility 
 
 
The following section draws principally on the comparative literature that addresses political participation and 
social mobilisation in conflict-affected and fragile states. It begins with a discussion on the links between social 
movements and instability. It then presents some general arguments about the potential for social movements 
to emerge in situations of conflict and fragility.  
Social movements and instability 
For the purposes of this review, and in line with the TORs and discussion with DFID advisers, armed 
revolutionary movements are not considered. The review is also weighted towards movements that are 
focused on bringing about progressive social and political change. (It does, however, cover the phenomenon of 
youth gangs in Nigeria, as the ambiguous nature of their activities, descent into violence and use of identity as 
a mobilising frame, provide some useful lessons.) The fact that even peaceful social movements mobilised 
around a desire for progressive change can contribute to instability must also be acknowledged. This is visible 
in recent organised protests in North Africa, where the Egyptian regime, previously considered stable if 
undemocratic, was overthrown, leading to current widespread uncertainty as to how the country’s governance 
structures will reorganise. Clearly protest leading to conflict and revolution can bring about more democratic 
and accountable states. Further, the ‘repertoire of contention’ which movements draw upon to protest 
publically may often involve violent aspects, notably destruction of property. But as Hazen (2009: 281) notes,  
 
The majority of social movement groups never engage in violent tactics, and those that do often use 
limited violent means in a more sporadic manner, rather than opting for a sustained campaign of violence. 
 
It is, therefore, perhaps appropriate to distinguish between types of violence: between direction action that 
involves infringement of property rights, and acts that purposefully put the lives and safety of the public at 
risk. However, it should also be noted that governments can conflate these two different types of violence, 
sometimes labelling both as ‘terrorism’, and enacting legislation through which protesters of largely peaceful 
protest find themselves facing prison sentences. There may be a role for donors here to moderate discussions 
with governments about direct action, so as to avoid all protests becoming criminalised.  
 
Nevertheless, members and leaders of initially non-violent movements can decide to take up arms for a 
number of reasons, and armed groups may have their origins in broader social movements. These are listed by 
Hazen (2009:281): 
 
Armed groups have often begun as a smaller subset of individuals within a mainstream social movement 
who are willing to pursue more radical strategies for political and social change by opting for violent 
means. Radicalization results from a number of factors: inaction by government to meet popular demands; 
repressive reactions by government to social protest; an ideology of change that accepts the use of 
violence as legitimate; threats to the survival of the group; competition for scarce resources from other 
social movement organizations; and, the perception that other social movement organizations are too 
weak or timid in their efforts to achieve change.  
  
Equally, resistance movements can lay down their arms and become integrated into political processes – for 
example the Maoist movement in Nepal.  Similarly, in El Salvador, the revolutionary movement, the FMLN, 
became a political party and in 2009 won the presidential elections. It is now considered to be pursuing a 
social democratic agenda. These examples demonstrate the fluid nature of social movements, that can take up 
arms but also then evolve into a political party that competes in democratic elections.  
 
Quantitative research on social movements by Norris (2006) argues that it is a mistake to assume that mass 
political activism in fragile states (as expressed through street protests, demonstrations, boycotts or political 
strikes) necessarily contributes to government instability. Her research is based on analysis of data produced in 
the World Values Survey, and compares 27 fragile states (16 democracies and 11 autocracies) with 49 states 
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considered stable.2
 
 Analysis of the attitudes of people engaged in protest in fragile democracies show that 
they are very similar to their counterparts in stable democracies. The fact that their profiles are so similar leads 
her to suggest that, 
Protest in fragile democracies does not represent a backlash against democracy or even the government in 
power, but rather it is similar in many regards to the background and motivation of activists in stable 
democracies. Fragile democracies face multiple challenges in consolidating and institutionalizing the 
regime, and deepening the quality of democratic institutions. But the profile of protestors suggests that 
this should function as a positive channel of expression and mobilization of civil society (Norris :14). 
 
She does note, however, that protesters in fragile autocracies are likely to be more politically polarized, with 
slightly greater numbers of people expressing a desire for radical change and being disapproving of democratic 
ideals. Noting the need for more analysis of these attitudes, she remarks that ‘it remains unclear whether 
these results form a consistent and coherent orientation’ (ibid:15). In general, the tenor of the research 
synthesis is positive,  
 
Although political protest was once regarded by some theorists as dangerous for the health of democracy, 
if it generated an over-loaded state and if it undermined traditional sources of authority, the evidence 
presented here and elsewhere strongly suggests that demonstrations, petitions and boycotts encourage a 
vibrant and active democratic state (ibid: 16). 
 
She concludes that in autocracies, greater levels of protest are associated with greater political instability, but 
that ‘protests are more likely to engage democratic sympathizers pressing for reform, rather than to be 
plebiscitary acts designed to maintain the power of the rulers’ (ibid). 
 
It should be acknowledged here that not all social movements are necessarily progressive, and even those that 
may provide some benefits locally, may not be stimulating democratic values, as understood by Western 
governments.  
 
Donors should not assume that all opposition movements are articulating the voice of the most oppressed 
and marginalised, particularly when they turn to violence. In the Delta region of Nigeria, an area of huge 
resource wealth, gangs of young men sabotage flow stations in order to be paid off by oil companies and 
form paramilitary groups to act as arbitrary ‘law enforcers’ on behalf of politicians. At base, the violence is 
the articulation of a demand for a greater share of the oil revenue. Yet violence does not open up spaces 
for participation by others, women for example; rather, it closes them down by negating the due process of 
the rule of law  (DRC-Citizenship 2006: 16).  
 
Opportunities for state-society engagement 
As pointed out in a recent synthesis of ten years of work by the Development Resource Centre on citizenship, 
participation and accountability, ‘Social movements and other forms of collective action are not a failure of 
democratic politics but are an essential component of it’ (DRC-Citizenship 2010: 13). They should thus be seen 
as an indicator of a growing sense of citizenship: individuals are sufficiently motivated to engage in a type of 
political space, have some perception that an injustice or a violation of rights is being perpetrated, and can find 
common ground with other people who they may begin to see as fellow citizens.  The DRC-Citizenship involved 
research across 25 different countries, a number of which can be classified as fragile. The synthesis report 
notes the different ways in which collective action may be channelled, depending on the extent to which the 
state provides spaces for societal engagement. Thus in Brazil, at one end of the spectrum, ‘invited spaces’ for 
participation of social movements and other civil society actors are constitutionally mandated. In this context, 
social movements also engage with the law in an attempt to bring about change – appealing to constitutional 
legislation, for example, to critique the state for failing to provide basic services. In situations of fragility and 
conflict, powerholders may demonstrate less political will to open up debate to representatives of society, or 
                                            
 
2 Classifications of stability and fragility are taken from the Political Stability Index designed by Daniel Kaufman and his 
World Bank colleagues.  
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state institutions may not have the capacity to operate in this way. Researchers from the DRC-Citizenship note 
that in cases where formal mechanisms for state response to society are ‘weak or non-responsive, citizens use 
street protest to claim perceived rights to service delivery’ (ibid: 11). They also stress the importance of local 
associations in countries where the state is weak, noting that ‘citizens use their own local associations not only 
to deliver support to one another, but also as vehicles for negotiating with local governments’ (ibid) and that 
these associations strengthen a culture of citizenship and can make the state more responsive. The research 
also notes that in countries where violence is prevalent, individuals may choose not to engage in collective 
action, withdrawing into ‘partial citizenship or self-censorship’ (ibid: 15).  
 
Given the debates recorded above on the wide variance in states that can be defined as ‘fragile’, it would be 
unwise to make generalizations on the nature of state-society relations in situations of conflict and instability. 
However, a number of shared characteristics can be suggested.  
 
Societies in fragile states are often polarised in ethnic, religious or class-based groups, often as a result of a 
legacy of conflict, or, some argue, colonialism. Critically, these societies are often dislocated from - and 
ambivalent towards - the state. Some argue identity fragmentation results in fragile states lacking the 
virtuous cycles of cooperation, trust, reciprocity and collective well- being that are vital in forming the 
social contract. Others argue states work best when they are structured around cohesive groups that can 
capitalize on their common institutions and affinities (Mcloughlin 2009: 23). 
 
It can be assumed that where societies are fragmented along ethnic and/or religious lines, the ability to 
mobilize broad swathes of society in pursuit of common interests may be more problematic. As Diani (2008) 
notes, where strong social cleavages are apparent, it is hard to form broad-based coalitions and social 
movements. How people perceive themselves in relation to the state is also critical for how they will mobilize. 
Kaplan (2008) has argued that in many fragile states, as a legacy of colonialism, geographical borders ignore 
socio-political and economic differences amongst different groups within these borders. It is thus hard to 
incorporate the informal norms of these groups into the formal bodies of the state. Further, in situations of 
fragility, the fact that there is often a small number of people controlling the institutions of the state, and 
benefitting from this, leads to a situation where the majority of citizens feels little loyalty towards the state, or 
any incentive to obey its laws. Thus fragile states are characterised by the fragmentation of political identity, 
combined with weak national institutions. Both of these factors may prevent the emergence of broad-based 
popular movements focused on bringing about change at a national level. Further discussion on the interplay 
between national and other identities and social mobilization is provided in section three. 
 
There is relatively little written about state-society engagement at the local level in situations of fragility. As 
noted by Oosterom (2009: 5),  
 
State fragility at the local level is an area that has received very little attention in both academic and policy 
circles. A particular knowledge gap is the interface between citizens and the local state; how the state-
citizen relationship can be rebuilt in an environment where social and political trust is minimal and where 
the threat of violence persists. 
 
She underscores conclusions drawn by the DRC-Citizenship that a failure to address local state-society 
relations ‘may hamper the consolidation of viable local democracies and undermine state legitimacy in the 
long run’ (ibid). Oosterom goes on to outline some of the logistical difficulties for societal engagement with 
local government in conflict-affected societies, noting that it may be difficult to attract qualified staff into 
areas affected by violence, physical infrastructure may be damaged, and there are fewer resources generally 
to fund the institutions of local governance. In the specific case of women’s participation in Sierra Leone, 
Castillejo (2008: 5) notes that ‘the capacity of state institutions to implement government policy and uphold 
state authority is very limited’, as a result, the state is unable to deliver the opportunities for participation it 
has formally provided to women because of limited capacity, corruption and lack of political commitment.   
 
Also critical are the political factors that may impede state-society relations in situations of conflict and 
instability. Where the central state is not in full control of its territory, organized non-state actors may emerge, 
and compete for authority (Oosterom 2009). In such tense local situations, negotiation by social movements 
with one actor may lead to repercussions from another. In her introduction to a review of the literature on 
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state-society relations in situations of conflict and fragility, Haider (2010: 6) has pointed out that in such 
situations,  
 
The prominence of informal institutions and relationships and unofficial processes result in divergences 
between formal systems and rules and actual practice. Political elites, who benefit from patronage and 
income from natural resource rents and criminal activities, often have little incentive to engage with 
citizens and to build effective public authority. 
 
This would suggest that the nature of fragile states places specific barriers to the ability of organized social 
movements to engage with the state. Thus where donors are working on governance reform in fragile states, 
they should consider how to create platforms for social movements and government to engage with each 
other, potentially promoting stability through greater responsiveness to society’s demands.  
 
Although not previously considered fragile states, analysis from the past decade of authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East provides a useful insight into the way that scholars have viewed the impact of this type of 
state on social organisation. Diani (2008) argues that collective action in authoritarian regimes is mainly based 
on the community and embedded in non-political forms of organisation. Further, ‘instances of collective 
action, taking the form of formal organizations or national social movements will be far rarer than in Western 
societies, while coalitions – especially cross-ideological coalitions – will tend to develop mostly on non-
controversial issues’ (ibid: 2-3). Examining the case of Egypt, and of a social movement that was a forerunner 
to recent protests, Bayat (2000) stresses how authoritarian, populist regimes with access to rents can shut 
down avenues for protest, by integrating large swathes of the population into a corporatist regime of 
dependency. Where many millions of families are dependent on the state for their livelihoods, it is difficult to 
mobilise them into an opposition force. With reference to Egypt and Iran, he further stresses the fact that few 
civic organisations that operate outside of kinship networks have been allowed to develop.  
 
However, El-Mahdi (2009) while noting the impact of a controlling regime on the Egyptian population, goes on 
to argue that too much weight has been placed on the structural barriers to mobilisation in the literature on 
the Middle East, overlooking the potential for agency amongst its populations. Recent events in the region 
would appear to support this thesis. Thus while Diani (2008: 4) points out that ‘neither social movements nor 
coalitions develop easily even in democratic, affluent countries […] they are even more problematic to find in 
less democratic settings, with limited resources’ and Oosterom (2009) makes a similar point about achieving 
accountable states in stable democracies, it is important not to discount citizens’ agency, even in the most 
unpromising of settings. As Pearce and McGee (2011: 12) note, ‘democratic civil participation is possible even 
in violent contexts and is a foundation for new kinds of responses to the problem’. In the case of current 
unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, there are clearly limits to the extent to which corporatist systems, 
and those based on the distribution of oil rents, can keep populations acquiescent. High unemployment and 
the youth bulge are seen to have been important factors in the revolution in Egypt. The ‘capacity to aspire’ to, 
and greater knowledge of, more democratic governance systems, through the spread of television and 
internet news media, may also be a factor behind growing opposition to autocratic regimes in the region.  
 
Individual responses to violence and instability 
At the individual level, citizens’ personal responses to situations of conflict and fragility will impact on their 
likelihood of engaging in collective action. Kabeer (2009), following Appadurai, has discussed the notion of the 
‘capacity to aspire’ as essential for poor people in Bangladesh to assert their citizenship by engaging in 
collective action. In situations of entrenched social inequality, in order to become citizens, she argues, 
individuals must ‘transcend the constraints of birth and ascribed status, to acquire the capacity to question, to 
challenge and to aspire – as well as the capacity to make changes that reflect these aspirations’ (Kabeer 2009: 
8). The ability to do this may be severely circumscribed in situations of conflict and violence. ‘In fragile settings, 
many factors are at play that pose a threat to developing a sense of agency and citizenship’ (Oosterom 2009: 
14). 
 
Violent conflict shapes peoples’ perceptions of the self as a citizen. Fear, insecurity, violent attacks, and 
numerous other events associated with conflict and repression result in feelings of powerlessness, 
marginalisation and humiliation. This has devastating consequences for a sense of civic agency, because the 
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necessary capacities cannot be developed. People will fear to challenge powerful actors and the people 
that dare risk violent repercussions. Compliance or even support to the status quo is in many cases an 
important coping strategy. The capacity to aspire will be diminished. Even when stability returns, people 
cannot be expected to develop civic agency instantly (Ibid: 15).  
 
Social relations and networks are also often damaged by conflict: ‘In situations of violent conflict, processes of 
‘othering’ and dehumanisation destroy social relations and networks and leave a legacy of deep mistrust and 
fear of others’ (Haider 2010: 16). This is also noted in Pearce’s (2007) work on Colombia and Guatemala, and 
by Paffenholz (2009:22) who summarises the issue thus: 
 
Violence destroys and disrupts existing forms of social organizations and social networks by spreading fear, 
distrust and intimidation. It is important to note that violence-induced changes not only affect the 
possibilities of civil society peacebuilding at a particular moment, but may also change the very structure of 
civil society. Second, violence limits the possibilities of civil society actors to fulfill their roles, as many 
become targets of violence. 
 
However, clearly, violence can also motivate people to engage in collective action – in peace or human rights 
movements. Paffenholz (2009) makes this point, noting the motivation for mobilization generated by the spill-
over of violence into everyday life.   
 
Social movement engagement in peacebuilding 
Research would suggest that in states where violence and conflict are nearing an end, and peace negotiations 
have started, social movements may emerge, or start to take on a great role in the public sphere. This issue 
has been researched in comparative perspective by Paffenholz (2009) and the Geneva-based Centre on 
Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding. Unfortunately, the research synthesis report refers in general terms 
to ‘civil society’ and does not give more nuanced analysis of which types of organization engage in specific 
peacebuilding activities. They note that, ‘during a window of opportunity for peace negotiation, civil society 
can take up very important – and in some instances – crucial roles in facilitating the onset of negotiations, or in 
advocating for the inclusion of pertinent issues into a peace agreement’. The report describes two different 
types of advocacy: mass mobilization including street protests, and more targeted lobbying work. The former, 
which is a strategy closely associated with social movements, is considered to have had a positive effect in 
Nepal, Northern Ireland and Cyprus. More formal advocacy campaigns were highlighted as important for the 
inclusion of specific issues into peace agreements – Guatemala and the DRC are cited as examples of this. It 
also notes that women’s groups are often successful in getting gender concerns on to the agenda when 
undertaking targeted advocacy at this time. The findings suggest, however, that the most effective form of 
advocacy is ‘mass mobilization for large-scale change, such as the end of war or authoritarian rule’ (Paffenholz 
2009: 19). The key barriers to this type of advocacy are listed as (i) shrinking space for civil society to act; (ii) 
lack of specialized knowledge amongst activists (iii) a highly restricted media. The issue of media – an area in 
which donors have been able to engage – is discussed in part three.  
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Part 2: Case studies of social movements in conflict 
affected and fragile states  
 
 
This section takes up some of the general arguments presented in part one, and examines them in light of 
country-specific case studies, presenting examples of the drivers of and barriers to individual engagement in 
social movements in situations of conflict and fragility. It is organised thematically, around the various types of 
social movement that emerge in such situations – peace activism, environmental movements, identity-based 
movements, faith-based movements and organised youth. Part two ends with a special discussion of youth 
gangs in Nigeria, reflecting the large amount of literature available on this type of collective action.  
 
These thematic sections are preceded by a separate discussion on the particular issues surrounding women’s 
engagement in collective action. However, as women are central actors in many different types of social 
movement, there is no separate section on ‘women’s movements’. These are discussed throughout the 
review, according to their thematic content.  
 
The TORs for this literature review set out a series of questions around the type of individuals who engage in 
social movement activity:  
 
 What motivates and enables individuals and communities to join together, i.e. by becoming members 
of local associations or other community based organisations, social movements, etc?  
 What are the gendered difference between motivations, ability to join etc?  
 What generalisations can be made about the type of change citizens seek through collective action at 
local level?   
 
The ability to provide detailed answers to these questions rests on the availability of in-depth ethnographic 
studies with movement members and leaders. These are in short supply, as many case studies of movement 
activity appear to rest on analysis of public events such as protests, and state reaction to these, rather than 
qualitative social research with individuals taking part in and/or organising these activities. The following 
analysis is, therefore, necessarily partial, based as it is on a very limited number of research studies.   
 
Women’s involvement in social movements 
Research from Latin America would suggest that women are often over-represented among the rank and file 
of social movements. This is, in part, because women are less likely to be working in the formal economy, and 
are thus perceived as having more time to go to meetings or take part in protest activities. This is particularly 
the case where social movements are organised around issues linked to the domestic sphere, such as housing 
and service delivery (Molyneux 2002). However, the extent to which women will be willing or permitted to 
engage in protest activities in public elsewhere in the world will depend on cultural and religious factors. 
Norris’ (2006) analysis of quantitative data on participation in protest discussed above suggests that men are 
more likely to be engaged in protest in fragile democracies. Those involved were also more likely to be 
amongst the better educated, and younger members of society. No discussion of gender difference in 
participation in fragile autocracies is given.  
 
However, women’s movements are often very important in situations of conflict and fragility, and a number of 
studies of such movements are available. Clearly the issues affecting women will vary from one situation of 
fragility to another, and cultural and religious factors will have implications for how women are able to 
organise, and their movements’ overall aims. However, Fallon (2008) draws some general findings about 
women’s relationship to the state in sub-Saharan Africa, which provides a useful backdrop to investigation of 
women’s movements in the region. Writing principally on Ghana, she notes common characteristics that are 
quite specific to the continent, namely that (i) women were systematically excluded from formal political 
institutions during the colonial period, and that the systems that have replaced these with independence tend 
to be ‘masculinist’ in nature, ‘preventing women’s equal participation in politics’ and (ii) many states that are 
in transition from authoritarian regimes have large state-run organizations that coopted women’s groups and 
17 
 
prevented them from direct engagement with the state. Noting that these organisations may continue to 
behave in this way, she argues ‘Women’s previous negative negotiations with the state may thus prevent them 
mobilizing with democratization’ (Fallon 2008: 35).  She further argues that even where women’s movements 
have managed to bring attention to a cause, and are lobbying for changes to the law, they may not be 
successful in ‘getting it through the legislative branch if men dominate the floor and do not see the policy as 
relevant to their own lives’ (ibid: 99). She cites the example of a coalition around domestic violence in Ghana, 
and the introduction of legislation around this issue has been a rallying cause for women across the continent. 
However, achieving mobilisation around the introduction of legislation is reliant on a belief that the law can 
actually promote social change, and knowledge of the workings of the judiciary may be limited to elite women. 
For example, Gbowee (2009) refers to an advocacy movement led by the Association of Female Lawyers of 
Liberia, that successfully lobbied to formulate a new rape bill for the country. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, 
Castillejo (2008: 13) notes, with reference to advocacy for the adoption of ‘gender bills’, as women’s education 
levels are low, it is ‘perhaps unavoidable that many women activists are members of an educated, English-
speaking elite’.  
 
Kaufman and Williams (2010) echo Fallon’s concern that the patriarchal nature of political and social systems 
can prevent women from being engaged in formal political process and effecting change through these 
forums. Focusing on women’s activism, they note that there may be a tendency for women to emphasise their 
traditional roles, as wives or mothers, at times of conflict, as it is considered less threatening to society 
generally. However, the absence of men from local communities during conflict can also force women to take 
on new roles. The political and social empowerment that can take place during conflict ‘emboldens women to 
take political action not only during the conflict but subsequently’ (Kaufman and Williams 2010: 6). However, 
while there are some examples (discussed below) of organized women’s movements having an impact on 
peace negotiations, the authors note that women may not be able to capitalize on the empowerment they 
have experienced during conflict once peace is reached, since patriarchal societies may not be willing to accept 
changed gender roles. This is noted in the specific case of Sierra Leone, where women’s activism is seen to 
have stalled in the post-war environment (Castillejo 2009).  
 
Kaufman and Williams (2010) argue that much women’s mobilisation during periods of conflict starts at the 
local level – reflecting the findings of the DRC-Citizenship in this regard. It also tends to be based around what 
are typically considered women’s issues – such as rape counselling, education, welfare rights and child care. 
However, the authors see broader forms of activism stemming from these activities, which give women,  
 
..the experience of organizing and uniting for a common cause, often among groups that would otherwise 
be in conflict. With participation in grassroots activism women also gain leadership skills. Furthermore, it is 
this community-based activism that often provides the common basis for women working across divisions 
for peace (ibid: 103).  
 
Nevertheless, they caution that women’s focus at the grassroots level remains outside the formal political 
process, and whilst they may manage to achieve some successes in the areas that are most important to them,  
 
Almost of necessity it also means that they are excluded from more formal politics, that is, the area of 
national decision-making. Thus, women political activists are often forced to make a choice: to work in the 
areas that they are most familiar with and where they feel they can have the most immediate impact, or to 
try to break into the large political decision-making structure and hope that their voices will be heard (ibid: 
117).  
 
In the case of Sierra Leone, Castillejo (2009) notes that women face less resistance from men when they limit 
their activism to the sphere of civil society – greater hostility is experienced when women activists attempt to 
engage in formal political processes. She argues that as women generally access rights and participate in 
governance within the domestic and community spheres, conceptions of citizenship should be extended 
beyond the narrow focus on the relationship between the individual and the state. This would help to 
understand ‘how women operate as citizens within the social groups of which they are members’ (Castillejo 
2008: 2). Nevertheless, there is a danger of confining women’s activism to these localized spheres – a point 
that she does acknowledge.  
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Examples of where women have managed to organize across class and ethnic boundaries and to move beyond 
the community level are discussed in part three of this report.  
 
Peace movements 
Castillejo has examined women’s engagement in peace activism in Sierra Leone in a series of articles. She 
argues that women became involved in political action on an unprecedented scale as a result of their 
experience of conflict, and that this influenced their demands for greater rights following the conflict 
(Castillejo 2009). She notes that rural women who were displaced to the capital, Freetown, became more 
aware of the relative autonomy and influence of women there, opening their eyes to the possibility of greater 
gender equality in their home communities. The importance of rights awareness for mobilization is implied in a 
second article (2008). She notes that ‘Many women, especially in rural areas, do not know their rights, are 
unaware that domestic violence is a crime, and have no knowledge of how the justice system functions’ 
(Castillejo 2008: 11). While the author is principally concerned with how individual women access the justice 
system, a lack of rights awareness will also impact on the potential for women to perceive an injustice and act 
upon it collectively. 
 
Press (2010) has examined the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) that was founded as a response to the stalling 
of peace negotiations in 1994, and went on to organize rallies, protests, vigils and sit-ins. Whilst initially 
spearheaded by educated women with links to the church and based in the capital, his interview respondents 
draw attention to the fact that participants were drawn from different social and economic backgrounds. A 
larger network, WIPNET was formed in the 2000s, and although it is very difficult to assess the impact of its 
activities, members carved out an informal space for themselves at peace negotiations by sending 
representatives to the venues where talks were held, and rallying women from the diaspora. WIPNET’s 
strategies included holding impromptu meetings with delegates (almost always men) in hallways, using the 
media to highlight their presence, insisting on being allowed to read statements to delegates and on one 
occasion blocking them into a room to encourage them to reach agreement.    
 
Press’s work highlights the fact that women were involved in peace activism during conflict and then 
attempted to influence peace negotiations. Similarly, Kaufman and Williams (2010: 87) assert that ‘women’s 
political activism typically starts during the period of conflict’. However, the exclusion of women’s concerns 
from peace negotiations and agreements can also spur women’s activism, as noted by Gbowee, who also 
examines the case of WIPNET in Liberia, and makes bolder claims than Press (2010) on their influence over the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003.  
 
In the case of Nepal, a non-violent social movement emerged at the time of peace negotiations, standing as a 
contrast to armed movements in the country – notably the Maoists and the Madhesi of the Terai. The Nepal 
Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP) drew high profile national figures to its ranks, and held 
highly visible events –  for example, sit-ins outside meetings of the Constituent Assembly – to call on the 
different parties involved to take the movement’s aims into consideration. They also protested against 
privileges being granted to the former King and his family. Shrestha and Adhikiar (2010) argue that rather than 
attempting to gain political control, the movement sought to present itself as apolitical, and to galvanise 
already existing political parties to engage more closely with the populous and to take on a democratic 
agenda. Ultimately, it aimed to create a more egalitarian, socially united Nepal. The authors note that although 
the core of the CMDP was and remains dominated by high caste and middle class professionals based in the 
capital,  
 
It did, however, attract and mobilise a much broader constituency and established linkages with groups 
outside of the capital, which began launching their own, no less daring, protest programmes (ibid 300-301). 
 
Evidence from Nepal, and elsewhere, would suggest that elite leadership does not necessarily delegitimize 
social movement activism, and may help to mobilize members at the grassroots.  
 
Alongside his work on the Liberian Women’s Initiative, Press (2009) has also examined the broader peace 
movement in Liberia. This work is interesting in that it engages with social movement theory around political 
opportunity. This body of work has argued that collective action increases as the political space for 
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participation opens. Based largely on studies from Western Europe and North America, it is clearly problematic 
when applied to conflict-affected and fragile states, where in some cases, repression has generated greater 
resistance. In the case of the Liberian peace movement, Press describes the movement as ‘micro-resistance’: 
its fluid nature and lack of clear leadership made it less of an obvious target for the regime. Its participants 
appear to have been largely drawn from the professional classes: Press notes lawyers, journalists, clergy, 
leaders of some nongovernment organizations, students, teachers and opposition politicians as amongst its 
ranks, using tactics such as lawsuits, critical published reports, clerical condemnations, strikes, and protest 
marches, in order to push for its goals of democracy, human rights, and peace (Press 2009). 
 
Socio-Environmental movements 
Whilst war and human rights abuses can provide the spark that sets off a wave of activism in fragile states, 
natural resource extraction can also provide the impetus. In these instances, local groups mobilize when they 
find that their livelihoods are threatened by the activities of outsiders (in particular foreign companies), and 
where the wealth generated is not perceived to be shared equitably. Obi (2005:4) notes the broad reach of 
environmental movements: in their struggle to contest the monopolization of environmental resources and its 
‘attendant abuses and corruption, environmental movements have also adopted political, ethnic, national and 
gender identities in Africa’. Some separatist movements have employed environmental discourse as part of 
their struggle over land ownership (ibid). It should be noted that many environmental movements have a 
strong human rights agenda, and may approach the issue of the environment through the lens of human 
rights. Thus justice and the environment are closely linked, as movements seek to denounce the destruction of 
ancestral lands and of traditional livelihood strategies.  
 
One of the most well-known environmental movement in sub-Saharan Africa is the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria. Obi (2005: 8) describes its aims as follows: 
 
It sought to contest and block further exploitation, pollution and marginalization of Ogoni oil-rich lands and 
the Ogoni people by the state-oil business alliance, and to assert Ogoni rights to claim and control their 
own resources. Essentially, the Ogoni struggle was one of identity in order to claim power over land.  
 
The movement sought to engage the state through the production of a bill of rights, that was adopted and 
signed by local leaders after ‘massive grassroots mobilization’ and in which the Ogoni set out their demands 
for political autonomy. Writing on the same movement, Mochizuki (2009) notes that the government 
essentially ignored these demands, and that power relations between the Ogoni and the alliance of the state 
and oil companies remain unchanged. Indeed, MOSOP was severely weakened by the killing of its charismatic 
leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa (Obi: 11). 
 
A second well-known environmental movement in sub-Saharan Africa that mobilised followers both around 
natural resource depletion and wider goals is the Green Belt Movement (GMB) of Kenya. Led by Wangari 
Mathai, who was at one point beaten by police for her activism (Fallon 2010), the movement is described by 
Obi (2005: 11) as a ‘grassroots women’s movement for the sustainable management of the environment and 
the economic empowerment of women’. The movement managed to link up the themes of poverty, 
environmental degradation and women’s marginalization, and advocated for a central role for women in local 
development through intervention in and control over the environment. Alongside environmental education 
and the conservation of forest resources, the movement also undertook direct action – planting trees in areas 
that had been deforested for luxury housing development, in an attempt to counter the private expropriation 
of public lands. Thus Obi (2005: 11) argues that the GBM ‘has confronted existing hegemonies in Kenya, 
particularly as they affect the ownership, control and use of land […] its programme of empowering women 
through tree planting and mobilization for environmental management directly challenges dominant 
patriarchal relations and the marginalization of women’.  
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Faith-based movements 
The role that religion can have in social movements is a broad and highly complex issue. Secular movements 
may have religious elements, but religion can also be at the centre of a movement’s mission and reason for 
existence. As noted by Kirmani (2008), religious movements have in the past been overlooked by social 
movement theorists. This is, however, now changing, as scholars place an increasing emphasis on the role of 
identity in social movement formation and acknowledge that there is a ‘great deal of overlap between the 
ways in which social movements and religious organizations mobilize around shared values and common ideals 
in order to assert a sense of collective solidarity’ (Kirmani 2008: 27).   
 
The level at which religious movements can operate ranges from the grassroots to the international, and their 
aims vary widely: from providing relief to the poor and destitute, proselytising, challenging the status quo or 
achieving political power. These aims may also overlap. In recent years, ‘fundamentalist’ movements, 
particularly Islamic ones, have received a disproportionate amount of attention from scholars. However, it 
should be stressed that religious movements often undertake development related advocacy and have helped 
to support and mobilise pro-democracy struggles (Kirmani 2008). For example, the Catholic Church played an 
important role in the democratisation in a number of countries, including Brazil, South Africa, Poland, Spain 
and the Philippines.  
 
In the Middle East and North Africa, Islamic movements have taken on a considerable role in terms of welfare 
provision, where government authorities have not been able to provide these. Notable in this regard are the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Grynkewich 2008) and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories (Gunning 2007). But 
while at the local level these movements might be seen to be promoting grassroots development, they are 
also regarded, in some quarters, as dangerous fundamentalist or even terrorist organisations. Analysts of 
Islamic social movements have also identified gender relations as a particularly problematic area. As noted by 
Ladbury and Khan (2008) the Muslim Brotherhood’s (somewhat undefined) stance on Shari’ah could have a 
negative impact on women’s rights were they to come to power. Their analysis of women’s piety movements 
in Egypt and Pakistan also illustrates the complexity of religious social movements. In these cases, women are 
engaged in socially conservative interpretations of the Qu’ran and hadith, and yet are empowered to take 
decisions over familial and neighbourhood relations based on their greater knowledge of these texts. 
 
In terms of resource mobilisation it is noted that religious organisations and societies can play an important 
role in providing a space for civil society. For Casanova (2001), Catholic and, potentially, Islamic institutions can 
provide the public space for nascent movements to organise and mobilise support. Following social network 
and resource mobilization theories, a number of scholars have pointed out how organized religion provides for 
frequent contact between members and ready-made networks of believers (Beckford 2001). Religion can also 
‘contribute to social movements by providing trained leadership capable of motivating and attracting 
participants’ (Smith 1996: 13) and by providing a moral justification for activism. Kirmani (2008: 32) however, 
cautions against taking religion as a stand-alone factor in social movement organisation, noting that it is often 
just one of a number of factors that interact ‘in order to produce and propel groups towards mobilization and 
action’.  
 
In-depth research on the issue of religion and social movements is being undertaken by a number of scholarly 
institutions, as overviewed by the GSDRC.3 Notably, the University of Birmingham has a strong profile in this 
area, and a number of papers are available on the Religions and Development research centre website.4
 
 
Organised youth and fragility 
The literature on youth involvement in collective action has a primary focus on violence and the activities of 
armed gangs. Indeed, the presence of a youthful population – often referred to as a ‘youth bulge’ – combined 
with high levels of un/underemployment is considered to be a causal factor of state fragility. Indeed, USAID 
(2006) includes a youth population bulge and youth unemployment as fragile state indicators.  
                                            
 
3 www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD644.pdf 
4 www.religionsandddevelopment.org 
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In regards to state fragility, the employment needs and opportunities of youth are particularly important; 
the literature indicates that grievances by this demographic group are the most likely to be expressed 
through violent means, if nonviolent political channels are not adequate or responsive (USAID 2006: 5).  
 
They also note urbanization and male secondary school net enrolment as important factors impacting on 
decision-making by young men, that can ‘play a key role in creating or avoiding conflict and state failure’ (ibid: 
12).   
 
It should be stressed here that unemployment and a young population do not necessarily lead to violence, and 
a ‘youth bulge’ cannot be used to predict war or violent unrest (Mclean Hilker and Fraser 2009). Youth 
mobilisation is not necessarily violent either. Organised young people are playing a leading role in recent 
peaceful pro-democracy mobilisations in North Africa and the Middle East, for example. However, given the 
forceful arguments of analysts such as Urdal (2004) who demonstrate a strong correlation between youth 
bulges and domestic armed conflict (particularly under conditions of economic stagnation), scholarly attention 
has been turned to finding examples of ‘resilience’: where young people have chosen not to be involved in 
organised crime and violence. Summarising these, Mclean Hilker and Fraser (2009) note the importance of 
‘strong communities’ that display high levels of social capital and can employ both incentives and sanctions to 
limit involvement in violence. UNDP (2006: 29) notes that religious movements, particularly Islamic and 
Christian Pentecostalist ones, can also provide this type of ‘strong community’. Despite their differences, both 
types of movement perform similar functions in societies, ‘providing youth with security, moral guidance as 
well as education, employment contacts, friendship and alliance networks – in essence, offering survival 
strategies for increasing numbers of young people as they move away from their families and communities’. In 
some cases, religious movements can specifically target youth grievances, such as those linked to education 
and employment. The case of the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement in Central Asia is indicative in this regard (Ibid). 
UNDP’s report also notes that religious movements can provide power and responsibility for young people in 
societies that are dominated by the elder generation.   
 
However, it should be noted that gang membership can also provide social capital, community, power and 
social space for young people, and these are aspects of its appeal. Benard (2005) examines how extremist 
movements can provide for young people’s social and psychological needs. She charts the ‘socialization’ of 
new recruits, including into terrorist groups, who experience ‘an increased sense of empowerment, purpose 
and self-importance’ (ibid: 69). They may also gain a ‘tangible sense of acceptance within the group, and in 
combination with this, the acquisition of real status within the broader community (ibid: 69-70).  
 
Youth, ethnicity and natural resources in Nigeria 
The literature on social movements in fragile states in Africa is strongly weighted towards the Nigerian case – 
where there has been a proliferation of armed youth gangs operating in the Delta region. Particularly critical 
for youth mobilisation is the high rate of unemployment in the region and worsening socio-economic 
conditions. As noted in the example from the DRC-Citizenship above, movements in Nigeria that are based 
around redistribution of resources do not necessarily open up space for participation of broader elements of 
society in how the local area should be governed. Whilst these movements do not fit the category of those 
pursuing progressive social and political change, as outlined in the TOR, it will be useful to examine them as 
the literature on these movements in Nigeria (of which there is considerably more than on other fragile states) 
helps to explain why more democratic and peaceful forms of collective action do not emerge. These case 
studies also offer up some important lessons on the role of ethnicity in social movements.  
 
Those writing on the Nigerian and West African experiences note that youth movements were a key part of 
independence struggles, but that since independence, the space for participation of young people has been in 
sharp decline, as have opportunities for civil society more generally to influence how the state is run (Sall 
2005; Mochizuki 2009). This has been put down, in part, to the desire by newly independent states to 
concentrate on the project of state-building, modernization and national growth, without the ‘distractions’ of 
competing social movements (Obi 2005; Sall 2004), and later oppression during authoritarian rule. Further, 
Mochizuki (2009: 219) notes the reluctance of young people to engage in national level political debates:  
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Experiences in the Niger Delta suggest that the present youth movements have a strong inclination to 
control resources at the community level. The youth could have demanded benefits at the national level 
through political representation at the centre, like those in the nationalist movement who redirected 
themselves toward national politics, but they felt that such a move might increase the risk of manipulation 
by elders closely connected to the government. 
 
Reno (2002) points out that there is no shortage of grievance amongst well-educated Nigerians, with regard to 
chronic failings of governance. Many people recognize that senior officials in government have little interest in 
providing services, or even in engaging in social reciprocity associated with patronage. Yet the intricate links 
between armed militias, decentralized politics and lucrative natural resource extraction prevents the 
emergence of more ideologically based movements, focused on systemic change, armed or peaceful. Reno 
argues that Nigeria’s misrule lays the basis for the rise of groups that ‘do not mobilize lasting popular support, 
and are unable to control individual predation among members’ (Reno 2002: 838). This has considerable 
impact on the options available for young people in the country. With few viable economic prospects, they 
organize to better themselves and their communities.  
 
But instead of fighting the entire political order that has done little to serve their interests, most (quite 
rationally) become reincorporated into existing political networks, perhaps on better individual terms. This 
poses a formidable collective action problem for potential revolutionaries and reformers, since they must 
contend with would-be followers who align themselves with politicians who will permit them access to 
loot, lest others get the goods before them and leave them out (ibid: 852).  
 
Similar patterns of behaviour are visible in other resource-rich states affected by conflict, notably Sierra Leone 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ibid; Sall 2004). Sall (2004: 604) gives the following explanation for the 
phenemonen in the West African region. 
 
The reasons for the spread of youth movements such as the vigilante group called the Bakassi Boys in 
eastern Nigeria, that was originally formed to fight criminals but later became ‘law enforcers and 
adjudicators’ are quite similar to those behind the enrolment of youth in warring factions in Sierra Leone 
and elsewhere: in both cases, a demand for recognition and an assertion of power by hitherto marginalized 
subjects who have taken the responsibility to secure or change their life-worlds. 
 
Hazen (2009) provides an in-depth look at the trajectory of youth movements into violence in Nigeria. Facing 
competition from other groups, as well as threats to its members, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) came to see violence as, 
 
the only available option to combat a closed political system and repressive military strategy. The threat to 
the survival of the NDPVF from both armed groups and the Nigerian military acted to reinforce the belief 
that military action was the only possible action available (Hazen 2009: 293).  
 
Hazen goes on to note that local officials’ lack of interest in governing, and the inability of the national 
government to reign in armed groups, created a void in ‘poor, underdeveloped, and ignored’ areas of the 
country, facilitating the entrance of groups of disaffected young men. 
 
Gore and Pratten (2003) also consider collective action amongst young people in Nigeria, looking at the 
phenomenon of area boys. They highlight the ambiguous nature of their aims and demands, listing their 
activities as ‘vigilantism, screening political candidates, monitoring local government expenditure, checking the 
award of compensation payments to local chiefs, threatening contractors and parastatals to complete 
development programmes, and monitoring price controls’ (ibid: 213).  The question of geographic location and 
ethnic identity become very important amongst these groups. They note that in Nigeria’s southern states, 
youth movements engage in the ‘discourses on marginalization, disorder and crime by drawing on idioms of 
particularistic community identity and on trajectories of age grades and secret societies’ (ibid). Area boys are 
considered to be a response to an influx of ‘strangers’ into urban areas, and fear of economic and political 
marginalization. These groups use ethnicity and belonging to the local area as a ‘trump card’ and defend, 
violently, their right to certain resources against other groups similarly mobilized around a particular identity 
(ibid). Gore and Pratten refer to the ‘ambivalent moral space’ within which area boys operate, where there is 
an ‘ongoing dialectic between local forms of moral accountability for the benefit of the wider community and 
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the instrumental means of economic survival for excluded and marginalized youth’ (ibid: 229). Other writers 
have identified the link between this type of behaviour and federal level policy in Nigeria that ‘uses ethnic 
identity as the primary identity for state entitlements and social rights’ (Adejumobi 2001:162). The critical 
issue of individual versus communitarian identity and citizenship will be discussed in the next section.   
 
The Nigerian case demonstrates one of the findings of social movement scholarship, that new forms of 
collective action do not ‘spring fully-formed from nowhere; they are bounded by the cultural and historical 
contexts in which they develop’ (Hayes 2007: 309). In this way, they often draw on knowledge of the strategies 
and ‘repertoires of contention’ used by older social movements. As Mochizuki (2009) notes, the example of 
the Ogoni’s organization in MOSOP led to a proliferation of other ethically-oriented movements in the oil-
producing states of Nigeria, making similar demands. However, the violent context of the Niger Delta and the 
availability of arms makes this imitation of social movement repertoires problematic. As Paffenholz (2009: 20) 
notes, ‘once a destructive approach to dealing with conflict has penetrated a society, there is a high risk that 
other conflict lines will also transform into violence’. 
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Part 3: Sustaining protest and scaling up to the national 
level 
 
 
Given the various ways that states can experience fragility and conflict, it would be unwise to draw any 
concrete lessons on the nature of collective action and social movements in these situations. There are, 
however, a number of areas relating to how movements mobilise and scale up protest in conflict affected and 
fragile states that can be discussed in more general terms. The following section considers the issues of 
leadership, identity, globalisation and the use of new media by social movement members and leaders.  
 
With reference to the TORs, this section of the report seeks to provide some answers to the following 
questions: 
 
 How do collective actors engage in action beyond the local level? 
 What are the barriers and enablers to social movements developing and progressing? 
 What is the role of elites? 
 Is new technology a factor in the way social movements develop? 
 
Leadership 
In a number of the studies of movements examined above, the authors make reference to the important role 
played by the leadership in mobilising and sustaining protest. Individual, charismatic leaders who show bravery 
by committing to their cause, despite threats of violence, were clearly important in the case of Wangari Mathai 
in the Green Belt Movement in Kenya, Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria’s MOSOP (Obi 2005), and the members of the 
peace movement in Liberia (Press 2010). It should, however, be noted that in these examples, and others 
discussed above, the original impetus for mobilisation came from members of the elite. In the case of Nepal’s 
citizen movement, the presence of high profile members of society at protests and sit-ins was a core part of 
movement strategy (Shrestha and Adhikiar 2010).  
 
Recent movements emerging in Pakistan also demonstrate the salience of elite leadership. For example, in the 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement, protest coalesced around a single figure, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry, after President Musharraf demanded his resignation and then suspended him when he refused to 
stand down. While the movement generated huge public interest and media coverage, Zaidi (2008) casts 
doubt on whether a movement, which he regards as principally engaged in protecting its own particular 
institutional interests, could reach out to a broader constituency and be part of a general movement for 
democratic change.  
 
While the potential of high-profile leaders to dynamise campaigns is clearly an important issue to take into 
consideration, Obi (2005: 15) cautions that movements built around ‘a charismatic or heroic leader’ can have 
limitations, ‘including institutional-organizational weaknesses and the factionalism that goes with this, as well 
as the general lack of transparency in the movements’ decision making and management of resources’. 
 
In other cases movements have no clear leader. In the Liberian case, as argued by Press (2009), this was a way 
of avoiding repression. The lack of clear leadership was also characteristic of the recent pro-democracy 
movement in Egypt, that similarly evaded the authorities by not presenting particular individuals as key figures 
in the protest, although leaders later began to emerge.5
                                            
 
5 In the case of Egypt, one such leader was the former head of the UN nuclear agency, Mohamed ElBaradei (an 
internationally recognized, high-profile figure) who returned to the country once the protests had begun. The 
Muslim Brotherhood also aligned itself with protesters once demonstrations had begun.  The relationship 
between spontaneous protest, elite leadership and organized opposition can be seen in this case to be very 
fluid.  
 It could perhaps be argued that the use of ‘small 
media’ such as text messaging and social networking sites facilitated the growth of a movement that emerged 
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without the need of strong leadership. The use of internet and mobile phones to organise protest on a large 
scale (such as in Egypt) is a new phenomena, and there is, as yet, little systematic research on the issue. 
Commentators have noted, however, that in Egypt, the protest was initiated by young people, who were well-
connected through mobile phones and internet sites such as Twitter and Facebook. These protesters were 
joined later by older generations and those without access to new technologies (Roy 2011). Both Roy (2011) 
and Sreberny (2011) stress that internet penetration rates are not high outside urban centres in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and that they vary enormously from one country to another. For example, in Yemen 
internet connectivity reaches less than 2% of the population, while in Bahrain this figure stands at 88%. 
Sreberny (2011), a leading scholar on media and communications cautions that new media do not produce 
change in and of themselves, and that Twitter, in itself, cannot explain the emergence of movements in Iran or 
Tunisia. Further, she argues that members of emerging social movements in the Middle East have employed a 
mix of face-to-face politics and contemporary small media.   
 
These examples of mobilisation that occur around a central figure or as a spontaneous response to a call to 
action, appear to stand in contrast to the findings of the DRC-Citizenship that stresses how social movements 
emerge from years, sometimes generations, of local associational activity. This research emphasises the role of 
local associational activity, as one of the most important routes into more politicised and wider-reaching 
collective action. Whilst this is not the only way that social movements can emerge, this type of activity can 
clearly contribute to greater awareness of rights and the potential benefits of collective action, acting as a type 
of ‘school for citizenship’. Studies from Bangladesh noted that citizenship ‘may not develop initially through 
engagement with the state’ but begin with ‘citizen-like’ engagement for poor women through informal courts, 
village factions, informal labour and credit markets, informal savings groups and NGO-mobilised groups. 
Research findings suggest that ‘such forms of organisation were vital first steps in developing a sense of self-
identity, and subsequently, of citizenship. They allowed individuals to translate their own individual grievances 
into a sense of collective injustice and then articulate these to those they felt should respond’ (DRC-Citizenship 
2006: 8). It should be noted that the methodological approach of the DRC-Citizenship work involved in-depth 
fieldwork which provided insight into the dynamics of collective action at the local level, perhaps bringing this 
kind of observation to the fore. This qualitative, more ethnographic approach is not a feature of the bulk of 
studies available in the public domain and which were accessed for the purposes of this review.   
 
Identity 
Whatever the nature of social movement organising – whether it is an organic process emerging from the 
grassroots over time, or a more spontaneous response to calls for action – it is clear that local place and 
identity are key issues for the development of social movements. While local organisation and feelings of 
belonging can encourage people to work together towards a common goal, it can also prevent movements 
from having traction at a wider scale, and building up a broad base of popular support. The delicate balancing 
act is highlighted by Paffenholz (2009:20), 
  
The specific in-group socialization of particular groups in a conflict situation has proven to be effective in 
many instances, as a generation of civic leaders have been empowered through training and capacity 
building (such as Maya activists in Guatemala or Dalith organizations in Nepal). However, the strengthening 
of group identity has also had negative effects; it can reinforcing existing conflict lines, and sometimes even 
facilitate radicalization, as demonstrated by some ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.   
 
These examples have echoes of Putnam’s (2000) debate on ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social capital, in which the 
former involves the development of networks between socially heterogeneous groups, while the latter 
strengthens networks within one specific group. In many cases, it is precisely when social actors manage to 
transcend class or caste boundaries – building Putnam’s bridges – that movements are able to promote more 
progressive social and political change.  
 
The emergence of coalitions and social movements depends to a large extent on the possibilities of forging 
shared agendas, developing social bonds cutting across clans, factions, and local communities, and creating 
and reinforcing collective identities. These in turn depend on the possibility of engaging in discourse and 
communicative action in public spaces. (Diani 2008: 12- 13). 
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Achieving this often involves a conscious process of ‘framing’ whereby movement spokespeople attempt to 
make their ultimate aims applicable to a wider group of people. Thus with reference to the Kifaya movement 
in Egypt, El-Mahdi (2009) notes that the movement’s principal members – middle-class people involved in 
political action for the first time – failed to make the link between the authoritarian regime and persisting high 
levels of poverty. By making purely political demands, rather than incorporating a socio-economic perspective, 
Kifaya lost access to the popular masses. More recently, Egyptian protesters have been able to overcome this 
problem and have made appeals to a broad Egyptian national identity in the framing of their demands, in an 
attempt to transcend class divides. The Kenyan Green Belt Movement similarly, can be considered to have 
gone beyond a discourse centred on environmental protection, to address issues of concern to poor women 
across the country, as did the Ogoni organisation MOSOP, in Nigeria (Obi 2005).  
 
Kaufman and Williams (2010: 94) highlight the ways in which women’s peace movements have been able to 
transcend ethnic, national and class divisions between women. Drawing on the examples of the Black Sash in 
apartheid South Africa, the Argentinian Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, the international Women in Black 
movement and the Israeli Parents against Silence, they note that, 
 
Rather than focusing on the factors that separate groups – ethnic, religious, national tribal, and so on – 
women were (and are) able to see all the issues that held them together. [In the examples above] women 
were united in their traditional roles as wives and mothers, which served as a common bond. They were 
bound together in their opposition to rape and other forms of violence against women that increase during 
times of conflict and war. They were opposed to discrimination against women, and they favored social 
justice and equality. They were often brought together by a common desire to improve the situation within 
their own communities, which is an area over which they felt they could have some impact. They were 
untied in their common desire to knit together a social fabric that has been torn apart way, and to do so in 
a way that would minimize the risk of violence in the future. And often, they realized that as wives and 
mothers they had common ideas and dreams, among them, the elimination of violence that was destroying 
their families. 
 
Thus, as Nerland and Ollek (2009) conclude, women used socialised gender roles to promote peace. However, 
they also point out that neither women nor their organisations are homogenous, and ethnic, religious and 
socioeconomic differences may impact upon their ability to find common ground and purpose.  
 
Some social movement scholars are pessimistic as to the ability of movements in the global south to find this 
common ground, and to work towards a more inclusive society. Thomson and Tapscott (2010: 14) argue that 
most mobilizations are ‘localized, sporadic and discontinuous, implying that their ideological mobilization was 
(and sometimes stays) shallow or non-existent’.  Certainly, the ease with which movements can appeal across 
class and ethnic difference drawing on broader citizenship identities varies, as does their motivation to do so. 
The need for movements to transcend local identity and encourage members to engage with the state as 
national citizens, rather than as members of a particular ethnic group is critical, particularly in fragile states. As 
noted above, fragile states are often ethnically fragmented, and in such circumstances, individuals may tend to 
stick to community, ethnicity and local associations. This can reinforce divisions, particularly when the group 
identifies itself in contrast to another social group that it presents as ‘other’.  
 
Osaghae (2010: 39) describes the prominence that communitarian ideas of citizenship have had in the African 
context:  
 
Proponents of communitarian rights […] argue that group rights are necessary for dealing with problems of 
citizenship in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies. […] The communitarian perspective is more popular 
in African and non-Western human rights discourses for at least two reasons. The first is the centrality of 
primary groups in social formations and political relations, which has been reinforced over the years by the 
ethnic profiling and group-arithmetic politics practiced by state managers…The second [is that] the struggle 
in Africa has historically been more for collective rights than for individual rights.  
 
It is precisely this construction of citizenship that Adejumobi (2001: 148) blames for much violent unrest in the 
region.  
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The construction and nature of the state in Africa, which is rooted in the colonial pedigree, tends toward 
the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements, rights, and privileges, which create differentiated and 
unequal status of citizenship. This tendency de-individualizes citizenship and makes it more of a group 
phenomenon. Rather than the state providing a common bond for the people through the tie of 
citizenship, with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, both in precepts and practice, people's loyalties 
are bifurcated.  
 
Adejumobi (2001), echoing Mamdani’s work on the legacies of indirect rule in the African post-colony, argues 
that the issue of non-individualised citizenship is particularly problematic in rural areas, where decentralised 
institutions have not been democratised. There, the relationship between the individual and the state 
continues to be mediated through membership of an ethnic group and the system. This reinforces ‘local ethnic 
and political identities, fragments the political process, and undermines the concept of common citizenship for 
the people in the country’ (ibid: 161). He continues,  
 
This tendency undermines the integrity and cohesion of the fragile African state and supplements the 
principle of territorial loyalty and citizenship with that of ethnic and community loyalty (ibid: 162).  
 
Douma (2006) refers to this situation as the break down of the social contract, where incumbent elites are not 
responsive to all of their constituents. Social movements can reinforce this breakdown by placing an emphasis 
on narrow, localised identities at the expense of a more inclusive idea of citizenship linked to the national 
state. They may encourage violence when they lay the blame for economic and social marginalisation on other 
ethnic or religious groups. This point is echoed by Paffenholz (2009) who notes the existence of, 
 
radical movements within civil society that openly foster an enemy image against the other group, such as 
settler movement in Israel or veteran associations in Bosnia, ethnic community associations in Nigeria, 
Sinhala nationalist organizations in Sri Lanka or the Orange Order in Northern Ireland (Paffenholz 2009:19). 
 
The research of Paffenholz and her colleagues further finds that in very divided societies civil society 
membership organizations often represent only one group, and can reinforce radical tendencies within 
societies. This is the case of the Madhesi in Nepal’s Terai region, who have used ethnicity to promote their 
claims for autonomy, and in the process, to demonise other groups and engage in acts of ethnic cleansing 
(Miklian 2009). The manipulation of identity is also characteristic of the way violent movements act in Nigeria, 
where the situation is exacerbated by a policy of ethnic federalism.  
 
Globalisation 
The research reviewed here highlights the traction that social movements in conflict affected and fragile states 
can gain by linking their demands and activities to debates overseas. Researchers from the DRC-Citizenship 
(2010: 13) note how activists and their organisations can benefit from linking their demands, ‘to existing 
national or international policy debates, laws or agreements, in order to gain greater legitimacy for their 
demands’. They note that this is a delicate process fraught with the potential to create conflict and contention 
among the different actors and between different levels. However, linking up to global human rights and 
environmental debates is regarded by observers to have contributed positively to attempts to raise the 
visibility of MOSOP’s struggles in the Niger Delta, and to the success of Kenya’s Green Belt Movement (Obi 
2005).  
 
Press (2009: 4), writing on the Liberian peace movement, also underlines the importance of international 
support for activists, noting that ‘access to the local media and to international human-rights organizations 
and interested members of the diplomatic community […] helped publicize abuses and bring international 
pressure to stop them’. Although human rights abuses continued in Liberia, he believes that the activities of 
international human rights organizations secured the release of some activists, and may have prevented more 
being arrested.  
 
Other important aspects of globalisation for social movements in situations of fragility and conflict is the 
presence of a supportive diaspora overseas, or in neighbouring countries. Paffenholz (2009:23) stresses the 
fact that many social movements in fragile states have parallel organisations in other parts of the world, and 
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that the study of social movements and fragility must look beyond the boundaries of a particular state. ‘Near 
diaspora’ across borders can continue to be part of conflict dynamics in their place of origin. Overseas, 
diasporas undertake advocacy work and keep issues visible within the media. She notes, further, that ‘it 
is not rare that diaspora organizations take on more extremist positions than civil society in the homeland’ 
(ibid) singling out Irish expatriates in the United States and Tamils in Europe and elsewhere.  Adejumobi (2001) 
makes a similar point about organised Tutsi outside Rwanda during the 1980s.  
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Part 4: Synthesis of findings on social movements and 
stability, gaps in the literature and key messages for 
donors 
 
 
This section includes a synthesis of the findings on social movements and stability that have emerged from this 
review. This discussion is relevant for how donors might consider supporting social movements in situations of 
fragility and conflict. Following this discussion, the section includes a brief consideration of the relationship of 
international donors to social movements, indicates where further research is needed and presents some key 
messages for donors. 
 
With reference to the TORs, this section responds to the following questions: 
 
 What evidence is there of the impact of donor interventions in this area? 
 Where are the gaps in the literature? 
 What recommendations does the evidence suggest for the role of donors? 
 
Synthesis of findings on social movements and stability 
Given the exploratory nature of this review, and the diversity of types of states and forms of social 
mobilisation discussed in it, drawing concrete conclusions about the nature of social movements in situations 
of conflict and fragility is highly problematic. However, some general points can be made.  
 
Evidence from this review suggests the importance of considering the interplay of movement activity and state 
stability, and of taking into account the existing state-society relationships. Thus, in more stable, democratic 
countries, relationships between state and society, and the institutions of the state that are in place, allow, to 
a greater or lesser extent, for responsiveness to movement demands. In these situations, there will be 
reasonably wide institutionalised channels for participation through which movements can express demands 
and through which the state can respond. This allows for a relatively stable state – a form of stability that 
might look something like an equilateral triangle: 
 
Stability is illustrated by the broad base, made up of the institutionalized channels of 
participation, that mean that even when the state is pushed, it will not ‘wobble’ 
precariously.  However, these situations are not necessarily permanent. There are 
cases in which, over time, the base of the triangle shrinks and so state-society 
relationships, and the state in particular, become more fragile.  This narrowing of the 
base can happen for many reasons: because of military coups (restricting participation), 
economic adjustment (restricting resource availability), or the emergence of intra-elite, 
ethnic or other conflicts. Examples of such states include Colombia and Peru, where conflicts massively 
weakened the state during the latter half of the twentieth century.   
 
A different form of state-society arrangements can be depicted as an upturned rectangle, in which there is 
very little breadth in state-society relationships, although there are some channels of participation, for 
example, operating through the ruling party, social programmes or organized clientelistic mechanisms.   
 
If the rectangle were to be pushed, the arrangement would soon wobble.  Or put another way, the 
apparent stability of many such regimes is more a trompe l’oeil than a reality – they are really much 
more fragile than they appear, and their stability derives from cults of leadership, from authoritarian 
control of the population, and/or from rents that can be distributed through the few channels of 
developmentalist state-society interaction that exist.  Movements unsatisfied with these 
arrangements might emerge for different reasons.  This may be as a result of cultural dimensions of 
globalization that drive a local capacity to aspire for something more, and/or because of political 
economy shifts that mean the regime is less able to absorb segments of society through the distribution of 
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rents. In these situations, movements that are not initially violent become so because the state does not 
respond to their demands, and/or responds to peaceful protest with violence. Recent events in Egypt and 
North Africa appear to fit with this model.  
 
At the other extreme are fragile states that might be depicted as an upturned triangle: 
 
These states and state-society arrangements are characterized by the existence of few 
channels of participation, few rents to share (or little capacity to distribute any rents that may 
exist) and perhaps also authoritarian rule.  Such states and state-society arrangements are 
even more likely to wobble in the face of mobilization. 
 
This analysis would suggest the need for careful consideration of existing state-society relationships, and of 
likely state responses to social mobilization by donors considering providing support to social movements. 
Donors will need to weigh up their concerns for stability alongside their aims to promote positive social and 
political change.  
 
External donors and social movements 
Recent events in the Middle East and North Africa, plus the achievements of social movements in improving 
living conditions for poor citizens – particularly in Latin America and Asia – highlight the potential for collective 
action to democratize the state and foster a sense of citizenship amongst movement members. Nevertheless, 
western aid agencies have not historically paid social movements a great deal of attention. There are a number 
of reasons for this, not least the unpredictable nature of social movement organizing, their often overt 
politicization, and their tendency to engage in extra-legal activity (protests, civil disobedience, land and 
building occupations) to draw public attention to their demands. As the DRC-Citizenship (2006: 15) contends, 
donors may see movements as unhelpful to state-building or concerned that national governments may resent 
foreign donors supporting groups perceived as the ‘opposition’. However, not only do social movements 
demonstrate the presence of active citizens, willing and able to engage with the state, ‘they test the state’s 
practical ability to uphold the constitutional rights of its citizens and demonstrate the maturity of its 
institutions (police and court system)’ (ibid). 
 
However, a number of problems are thrown up by direct donor support of social movements. Firstly, many 
social movements will prefer not to take money from outside sources, for fear of appearing to have been 
coopted and to have lost autonomy (Earle and Pratt 2009). Further, as noted by the DRC-Citizenship (2006) 
when donors finance movement activities (either directly or through NGOs) they may inadvertently create 
competition around resources. They may also trigger certain types of behaviour amongst movements, who 
begin to respond more to donor demands than members’ interests and needs (Earle 2009).  
 
But while direct support to movements appears to have been lacking, as the DRC-Citizenship (2006:9 ) notes, 
  
The ‘empowered’ poor citizen does not emerge overnight. She or he emerges gradually through local level 
struggles around livelihoods or access to services […] This implies that decades of donor support to 
‘participation’ and to forms of local level association – micro- credit groups for example – are likely to have 
had a positive, long term, state building function.  
 
Whilst it is very hard to evaluate donor support to civil society, recent BBC radio 4 debates refer to the 
American National Endowment for Democracy’s long-term efforts to build civil society in Egypt, and suggest 
they may have contributed to the recent movement for democratic change in the country. This has echoes of 
Hirschman’s (1984) discussion of ‘social energy’, where the potential for collective action lies dormant, but can 
be mobilized at key moments. Other observers place greater emphasis on the activities of political mobilisation 
and workers’ strikes over the last decade and privilege their contribution to the revolution in Egypt.  
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Gaps in the literature 
The limitations of social movement theory and traditional approaches to the study of collective action in the 
context of the Global South, in general, has been highlighted by a number of authors cited elsewhere in this 
review. For example, Thompson and Tapscott  (2010: 1) note that where research has been undertaken in non-
Western and transitional contexts,   
 
Social movements have invariably been analysed in terms of criteria derived from Northern experience. […] 
In the absence of historically grounded empirical research, social movements in these societies and the 
struggles that underpin them are not infrequently reduced to caricature. This mode of investigation, 
typified by long-range event analysis, denies the complexity of social formations in the South, and, ignoring 
any prospect of agency, portrays their members as the hapless victims of tyrannical rulers and traditional 
culture or the passive recipients of Northern-led actions.  
 
The absence of more qualitative research with social movement members and leaders has already been 
highlighted in this review.  This type of research would allow for greater understanding of individual 
motivations (or lack of) to engage in collective action.  
 
There is also, in general, very little analysis available of the interactions between states and social movements 
which result from social movement activity. Beyond descriptions of protests, or analysis of the number and 
type of activities engaged in, research of this nature would permit insight into the micro-processes of 
negotiation that occur when movements undertake protests and lobbying activities. Long-range event analysis 
cannot explain why some movement strategies and activities generate more positive responses from the state 
and society more generally.   
 
More research is needed on the interplay of social movements, violence and instability. This could help to 
explain the factors surrounding decisions by social movements to take up arms and the impact of this on their 
potential to bring about progressive social and political change.  
 
Key messages for donors working with social movements in situations of conflict fragility 
Social movements are complex and unpredictable and can be politicized, but joining a movement can also 
serve as way in which individuals  - particularly those from excluded groups - gain understanding of and engage 
in political society. Donors should not shy away from finding innovative ways to support the emergence and 
development of movements and should concentrate on promoting a supportive environment for social 
movement activity.  
 
Social movements may not wish to be directly associated with international donors, and it may be politically 
complicated for donors to provide direct support. However, donors can play a role in facilitating movements’s 
engagement with the state. This can include reminding governments of their obligations to allow (not to 
criminalise) collective action. 
 
Social movements can contribute to democracy and progressive change. But they may achieve this by 
generating instability. Donors must acknowledge the delicate nature of this equation, and support for an 
enabling environment for social movements should be based on careful analysis of both existing state-society 
relations, and the potential response of the state to increased levels of collective action. 
 
Civil society activism can contribute to stability and democracy in situations of conflict and at the time of peace 
negotiations and peace-building. As such, support for a public space in which social movements can engage 
should not necessarily be deferred until formal democratic institutions and processes have been established. 
  
Support for the media can be critical for peace activism and for human rights movements. The work of 
journalists and lawyers to investigate and report human rights abuses can help to maintain mobilization and 
draw in support from likeminded movements outside of the country. It is also critical in ensuring awareness 
amongst donors and international institutions that can undertake high-level lobbying. This support can be as 
basic as ensuring that newspaper presses are functioning. 
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Social movement members and leaders can be supported to make the most of the media to support their 
aims. For example, training on making statements to the press, bringing out pamphlets that explain their 
demands, using mobile phones (and internet, where penetration rates make this viable) to exchange 
information and connect members across geographical areas.  
 
Women’s involvement in social movements can be wide-ranging, addressing many different areas of social 
injustice. Women have been instrumental in bringing about the cessation of conflict and in peacebuilding 
efforts. Donors should encourage and enable social movements to ensure women’s participation and 
leadership. Donors should recognise that women may need particular support in order to engage in 
democratic social movements and should recognise that women’s social movements take many forms. 
 
Elite leadership does not necessarily delegitimize social movements, and having a dynamic, charismatic figure 
at the centre of collective action can help to mobilize the grassroots. However, donors should be wary of 
limiting their support to civil society based in large urban centres or comprised only of literate, European 
language-speaking men; and should work with partners to improve communications beyond capital cities and 
their usual interlocutors. This could involve support for translating key messages into languages and formats 
that are accessible to less well-educated groups or providing funds for child care support to women to 
participate in movement activities. 
  
Rights education is critical. People must be able to recognise an injustice and know how to seek redress in 
order to mobilise. This can, again, be a challenge where communications are difficult, and where knowledge of 
the language of government/officialdom is poor. Donors can learn from UN or NGO partners who have worked 
on these issues. 
  
Similarly, in countries with a minimal rule of law, social movement members and leaders can benefit from an 
understanding of the workings of the judiciary and how it can serve their interests. Lessons can be learnt here 
from movements in Latin America and Asia that have used the courts or leveraged the support of the legal 
profession to achieve their aims. Donors can help by supporting moves to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary. 
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Social movement case studies discussed in this literature review 
 
 
 
Author Title Geographical 
focus 
Movement 
members / focus 
Type of publication 
Bayat, A. Social movements, activism and social development in the Middle East Middle East Urban mass movements; 
Labour; Islam; 
Community Development 
Peer-reviewed UN publication 
Castillejo, C. Women’s political participation and influence in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Women Research Institute Working Paper 
Castillejo, C. Strengthening women’s citizenship in the context of state-building: The 
experience of Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone Women Research Institute Working Paper 
Diani, M.  Social movement theory and grassroots coalitions in the Middle East Middle East Non-specific Conference Paper 
El-Mahdi, R. Enough! Egypt’s quest for democracy Egypt Pro-democracy Peer-reviewed journal 
Fallon, K Democracy and the rise of women’s movements in sub-Saharan Africa Ghana (main 
focus) 
Women’s movements Monograph published by university press 
Gbowee, L.  Effecting change through women’s activism in Liberia Liberia Women; peace Non-peer reviewed university bulletin 
Gore, C. & 
Pratten, D. 
The politics of plunder: The rhetorics of order and disorder in southern Nigeria Nigeria Youth (gangs) Peer-reviewed journal 
Hazen, J.  From social movement to armed group: A case study from Nigeria Nigeria Youth; resource control Peer-reviewed journal 
Kaufman, J. & 
Williams, K.  
Women and war. Gender identity and activism in times of conflict Global Women; peace Monograph published by academic press 
Miklian, J.  Nepal’s Terai: Constructing an ethnic conflict Nepal Ethnic identity; autonomy Research Institute briefing paper 
Mochizuki, K Opposition movements and the youth in Nigeria’s oil-producing area: an inquiry 
into framing 
Nigeria Youth; resource control Monograph published by academic press 
Norris, P. Political protest in fragile states. Global Non-specific Conference paper 
Obi, C. Environmental movements in sub-Saharan Africa. A political ecology of power and 
conflict. 
Nigeria; Kenya Environmental Peer-reviewed UN publication 
Osaghae, E. Social movements and rights claims: the case of action groups in the Niger Delta Nigeria Resource control Monograph published by academic press 
Press, R. Courage, Principle and Ambition: Human Rights Activism in Liberia and Policy 
Implications for Taming Authoritarian Regimes 
Liberia Women; peace ‘Policy and practice note’ in peer-reviewed 
journal  
Press, R. Candles in the wind: Resisting repression in Liberia (1979-2003) Liberia Peace; Human rights Article in peer-reviewed journal 
Press, R. “Guided by the hand of God”: Liberian women peacemakers and civil war Liberia Women; peace Article in non-peer-reviewed journal 
Reno, W. The politics of insurgency in collapsing states Nigeria Youth; resource control Article in peer-reviewed journal 
Sall, E. Social movements in the renegotiation of the bases for citizenship in West Africa Sierra Leone, 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Youth Article in peer-reviewed journal 
Shrestha, C. 
& Adhikiar, R. 
Antipolitics and counterpolitics in Nepal’s civil society: The case of Nepal’s 
Citizens’ Movement 
Nepal Pro-democracy Article in peer-reviewed journal 
Zaidi, S.A. An emerging civil society? Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement Article in peer-reviewed journal 
 
